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TOWARD EQUALITY: NONMARITAL CHILDREN
AND THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE†
Paula A. Monopoli*
This Article traces the evolution of the Uniform Probate Code’s (UPC) broad
equality framework for inheritance by nonmarital children in the context of the
wider movement for legal equality for such children in society. It concludes that the
UPC is to be lauded for its efforts to provide equal treatment to all nonmarital
children. The UPC’s commitment to such equality serves an expressive function for
state legislatures and courts to follow its lead. The UPC has fulfilled its promise
that all children regardless of marital status shall be equal for purposes of
inheritance from or through parents, with one exception: its adoption of an agency
approach to the inclusion of such children in class gifts from nonparent
transferors. The Article analyzes this one exception and evaluates the systemic costs
and constitutional concerns surrounding the use of an agency theory in this
context. The Article concludes that a previous default rule under the UPC was the
more equitable approach and suggests a return to that rule as it existed from 1975
to 1990. This approach was recently embraced by the Massachusetts legislature in
its new probate code.

Introduction
The 1960s witnessed an equality revolution that we usually
associate with race and gender. But there was another, less visible,
equality movement that had its roots in that era—the idea that
children born out of wedlock, or “nonmarital” children, should be
treated in the same way as children born to a married couple.
Legal scholars began to lay the groundwork for a theory of equal
treatment of nonmarital children, and the original 1969 Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) reflected that scholarly embrace of equality
and civil rights. The UPC has remained faithful to that original
equality framework. This Article analyzes how the UPC’s equality
framework has evolved since 1969 to provide for the equal
treatment of virtually all nonmarital children. With one small
exception—class gifts from nonparent transferors—the UPC has
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provided nonmarital children the opportunity to inherit from and
through their parents in the same manner as children born in
wedlock.
Part I discusses the evolution of the law concerning nonmarital
children and the development of the UPC’s broad protective
framework for nonmarital children. Part II examines how using an
agency approach in section 2-705(e) of the UPC to determine
whether nonmarital children should be included in a class gift
from a nonparent transferor deviates from the UPC’s overall
equality framework. Part III illustrates the costs of such an agency
approach, while Part IV outlines a possible constitutional argument
against the approach. Part V argues for a return to the default rule
found in the version of section 2-611 of the UPC as it existed
between 1975 and 1990 and recently embraced by the
Massachusetts legislature in its new probate code.
I. The Evolution of the Case Law, the UPC, and the UPA
As noted above, in the midst of the 1960s-era equality
revolution in gender and race, scholars were also developing
an intellectual framework for legislative and judicial law
reform with regard to society’s unequal treatment of
nonmarital children. For example, in his 1966 article,
Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform
Act on Legitimacy, 1 Professor Harry Krause noted the
“inadequacy” of the treatment of nonmarital children under
2
the common law and proposed a model statute that would
provide a framework for equality. 3 In 1967, Krause wrote a
4
second article, entitled Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, in
which he argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment should apply to statutes that treat
5
nonmarital children differently from marital children.

1.
Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act on
Legitimacy, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 829 (1966).
2.
Id. at 831.
3.
Id.
4.
Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 477 (1967).
5.
See id. at 484.

Monopoli FTP 5_C.doc

Summer 2012]

8/8/2012 8:58 AM

Nonmarital Children and Uniform Probate Code

997

Krause argued that these statutes reflected a significant bias
6
7
against such children and were arguably unconstitutional.
A. Case Law
Krause’s articles provided the theoretical groundwork for the
8
U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 1968 decision in Levy v. Louisiana,
in which five nonmarital children sought damages for the wrongful
death of their mother.9 Under the relevant Louisiana statute, a
10
child could recover damages for a parent’s wrongful death; the
Louisiana Court of Appeal, however, held that “child,” as used in
the statute, only referred to “legitimate child” and therefore
excluded nonmarital children.11 The Court reversed the Louisiana
Court of Appeal, holding that nonmarital children were “‘persons’
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”12 The Court said that a state could not
“draw a line which constitutes an invidious discrimination against a
particular class.”13 The Court also held that a state could not
discriminate against nonmarital children “when no action,

6.
See id. at 500. According to Krause, there are five primary justifications for
discriminatory legislation against nonmarital children. Krause argues against each of these
justifications, asserting that the real motivation behind this legislation is the “long history of
discrimination against the illegitimate.” Id. The first justification is that there is more
uncertainty regarding paternity for nonmarital children. This is not a sufficient justification
because every birth is unique; paternity may be certain for many nonmarital children, and
may be uncertain for many children born in wedlock. The second justification is that
legislation against nonmarital children discourages promiscuity. This justification fails
because such legislation unfairly punishes illegitimate children for the mistakes of their
parents, and it does not effectively prevent unmarried couples from having sex. The third
justification is to protect the family unit. As with the second justification, this justification
fails because a state that truly wants to prohibit casual unions can do so directly rather than
by unfairly punishing the children produced by casual relationships. The fourth justification
is that nonmarital children do not have close relationships with their fathers. This
justification, however, does not accurately portray reality in that an illegitimate child may
already have a close relationship with his father, while a legitimate child may never have met
his father. The final justification is that it should be the father’s choice whether to recognize
a nonmarital child. This is unpersuasive, because it may result in a child being stigmatized
through the term bastard and, more significantly, in the loss of property rights and social
status afforded most children. See id. at 489–96.
7.
See id. at 500.
8.
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
9.
Id. at 69. The lawsuit was filed against their mother’s doctor and insurance
company. Id. at 70.
10.
Id. at 70 n.1.
11.
Id. at 70.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. at 71.
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conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm
14
that was done the mother.”
The Court arguably retreated a bit from its ruling in Levy when,
in 1971, it upheld a statutory distinction between marital and
15
nonmarital children in Labine v. Vincent. Labine involved a
nonmarital child whose father died intestate.16 Louisiana law
provided that an acknowledged nonmarital child could only
inherit when her father “has left no descendants nor ascendants,
nor collateral relations, nor surviving wife.”17 Thus, the lower court
found that the father’s brothers and sisters, and not the nonmarital
18
child, should inherit the entire estate.
In affirming the lower court’s decision, the Court declined to
extend its reasoning in Levy, noting that “Levy did not say and
cannot be fairly read to say that a State can never treat an
illegitimate child differently from legitimate offspring.”19 The
Court emphasized that, unlike the statute in Levy “where the State
20
. . . created an insurmountable barrier” for nonmarital children,
the statute in Labine permitted nonmarital children to inherit from
the estates of their fathers under certain circumstances; for
example, a nonmarital child could inherit from her father if her
father had executed a will naming her as one of his beneficiaries,
legitimated her by marrying her mother, or followed a procedure
provided for under Louisiana law in conjunction with his
acknowledgement of paternity.21 The Court, therefore, held that
the law violated neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due
22
Process Clause, and affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The Labine Court was sharply divided, with five justices in the
majority and four justices joining Justice Brennan’s dissent.23 In his
24
dissent, Justice Brennan’s analysis foreshadows the later 5–4
25
decision in Trimble v. Gordon, discussed below, in which the Court
14.
Id. at 72.
15.
401 U.S. 532 (1971).
16.
Id. at 533.
17.
Id. at 534.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 536.
20.
Id. at 539.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. at 539–40.
23.
Id. at 541 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24.
Justice Brennan notes that all the authorities cited to the Court, including the
UPC, suggest the conclusion that a father who has publicly acknowledged his child would
not want to disinherit her. This mention of the UPC by Justice Brennan indicates that even a
mere two years after it was promulgated, the UPC was having an impact at the highest
jurisprudential levels. See id. at 556 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25.
430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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found that an intestacy statute that treated nonmarital children
differently from marital children violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
From 1971 to 1978, the Court continued to develop its
jurisprudential approach regarding nonmarital children and
intestacy statutes. In 1977 and 1978, respectively, the Court decided
26
the landmark inheritance cases Trimble v. Gordon and Lalli v. Lalli,
both of which are discussed in more detail in Part IV below.27
Trimble and Lalli, taken together, established the current
constitutional parameters for state inheritance statutes as they
apply to nonmarital children; these parameters include an
intermediate standard of scrutiny for such statutes, affording
nonmarital children a higher level of constitutional protection
than that afforded under the rational basis standard used in
Labine.28
B. The UPC
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the UPC in 1969.29 Technical
amendments were incorporated in 1975 in response to the
enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in 1973. NCCUSL
further revised Article II in 1990 and 2008. The following sections
trace the evolution of the statutes that define the parent-child
relationship for purposes of intestacy and class gifts.
1. Intestacy
Section 2-109 of the original UPC allowed a nonmarital child to
30
inherit from his mother when she died intestate. In order for a
nonmarital child to inherit from his father in intestacy, however,
the child had to establish such eligibility31 in one of three ways:
(1) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony after
the child’s birth; (2) paternity was established by adjudication prior

26.
439 U.S. 259 (1978).
27.
See infra notes 163–172 and accompanying text.
28.
See analysis of Trimble infra note 170 and accompanying text.
29.
Unif. Probate Code historical notes (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 1 (1998). NCCUSL
is now known as the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), but this Article will refer to it as
NCCUSL.
30.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-109(1) (1969) (amended 2008).
31.
See id.
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to the father’s death; or (3) paternity was established after the
32
father’s death by clear and convincing proof.
33
In 1975, NCCUSL amended the UPC to conform it to the
recently promulgated UPA.34 The UPC provided that if a state had
enacted the UPA, the UPA’s mechanism for establishing paternity
35
would apply; if a state had not enacted the UPA, an alternative
subsection of section 2-109 prescribing the mechanism by which a
child could demonstrate that he was a child of the father would
apply.36
In 1990, Article II of the UPC was significantly revised.37 Section
38
2-109 essentially became section 2-114. Section 2-114 defined the
parent-child relationship as follows: “an individual is the child of
his [or her] natural parents, regardless of their marital status.”39
The relationship between parent and child could be established
under the mechanism provided under the UPA or, if a state had
not enacted the UPA, under applicable state law.40
41
Finally, in 2008, Article II of the UPC was amended again.
Section 2-114 effectively became sections 2-115, 2-116, and 2-117.
When read together these provisions provide a definition of
32.
Id. § 2-109(1)(i)–(ii).
33.
Unif. Probate Code 1975 technical amendments (1975), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 1
(1998).
34.
See id., 8 U.L.A., pt. I, at 2 (1998).
35.
Unif. Probate Code § 2-109 (1975) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 284 (1998).
36.
See id. If a state had not adopted the UPA, it could adopt the alternative subsection,
which read as follows:
[(2) In cases not covered by Paragraph (1), a person born out of wedlock is a child of
the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if:
(i)

The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or
after the birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void;
or
(ii)
The paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the
father or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, but
the paternity established under this subparagraph is ineffective to
qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or through the child
unless the father has openly treated the child as his, and has not
refused to support the child.]
Id. This bracketed portion of section 2-109 kept the prior language of the UPC merely in the
event that a state had not adopted the UPA.
37.
See Unif. Probate Code art. 2, prefatory note (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 75 (1998).
38.
See Patricia G. Roberts, Adopted and Nonmarital Children—Exploring the 1990 Uniform
Probate Code’s Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 539, 540 (1998).
39.
Unif. Probate Code § 2-114(a) (1990) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 91
(1998) (the bracketed phrase “or her” is included in the UPC provision’s text).
40.
See id. § 2-114(a) & cmt. (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 91 (1998).
41.
Unif. Probate Code art. 2, prefatory note (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 33 (Supp.
2011).
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genetic fathers and mothers,42 explain the effect of establishing a
43
parent-child relationship, and establish that a parent-child
relationship exists between parents and children regardless of the
parents’ marital status.44
2. Rules of Construction and Class Gifts
Bequests in a will or trust that reference the beneficiary’s
relationship to a particular person, for example a bequest to “my
daughter’s children,” are known as class gifts. In 1969, the original
section 2-611 of the UPC provided that an out-of-wedlock child
would be included in a class gift to the child’s natural parent’s
children if he met the definition of “child” under the intestacy
45
rules of section 2-109. However, an out-of-wedlock child would
only be considered a child of his father for construing class gifts if
46
he had been openly and notoriously treated as such by the father.
In the same 1975 technical amendments that conformed the UPC
to the UPA, this open and notorious provision was dropped such
that, under section 2-611, if a nonmarital child were included for
purposes of intestacy under section 2-109, the nonmarital child
would be included in a class gift from either of his parents or from
nonparents.47
In 1990, section 2-611 became section 2-705,48 which provided
that nonmarital children were included in class gifts from
49
parents. However, this new section made a significant policy shift
with regard to nonparent transferors. Unlike the 1975–1990
version of section 2-611 of the UPC, section 2-705 added an
42.
See id. § 2-115, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 50–51 (Supp. 2011).
43.
See id. § 2-115 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 52 (Supp. 2011).
44.
See id. § 2-117, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 53 (Supp. 2011). Exceptions to this rule are noted
in §§ 2-114, 2-119, 2-120, and 2-121. See id.; see also Unif. Probate Code § 2-117 cmt. (2011),
8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 53 (Supp. 2011).
45.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-611 (1969) (amended 1990); see also Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs of Unif. State Laws, 1975 Proceedings in Committee of the
Whole, Uniform Probate Code Amendments 13 [hereinafter National Conference
Proceedings].
46.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-611 (1969) (amended 1990) (noting that “a person
born out of wedlock is not treated as the child of the father unless the person is openly and
notoriously so treated by the father”); see also National Conference Proceedings 13.
47.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-611 (1975) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 434
(1998); see also National Conference Proceedings, supra note 45, at 13–14. (identifying
the switch from a system placing a “burden” on the child to a system conforming to the
UPA).
48.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-705 (1990) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 187
(1998).
49.
See id. § 2-705(a) 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 187 (1998).
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additional hurdle to those nonmarital children seeking inclusion
in a class gift from nonparents. Section 2-705(b) of the UPC stated
the following:
(b) [I]n construing a dispositive provision of a transferor who
is not the natural parent, an individual born to the natural
parent is not considered the child of that parent unless the
individual lived while a minor as a regular member of the
household of that natural parent or of that parent’s parent,
50
brother, sister, spouse, or surviving spouse.
51
In 2008, section 2-705 was amended again. Section 2-705(e)
now provides that the parent or another specified relative must
have functioned as a parent in order for a nonmarital child to be
included in a class gift from a nonparent.52 The concept
“functioned as a parent of the child” is defined in the new section
2-115 and, as the Comment notes, is adapted from the Restatement
53
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.

C. The UPA
54
The UPA was first promulgated in 1973 by NCCUSL, and its
provisions regarding parentage are incorporated by reference into

50.
Id. at 187–88. According to the Amendments section following the comment
associated with § 2-705, the 1991 amendment in subsection (b) substituted “dispositive
provision of” for “donative disposition by.” Id. at 189.
51.
See id. § 2-705 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141–42 (Supp. 2011). Note that section 2705(b) was amended again in 2010 to clarify that an expression of contrary intent as to
inclusion or exclusion of a child born to parents who were not married to each other was
not to be applied to children born as the result of assisted reproduction. Exec. Comm. of
the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Probate Code
Conforming and Technical Amendments 16 (2010).
52.
See id. § 2-705(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
53.
Id. § 2-115 cmt. (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 51 (Supp. 2011) (citing Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 14.5 reporter’s note 4 as
providing a description of the behaviors that constitute “functioned as a parent of the
child”). Section 2-115 provides that functioning as a parent means:
[B]ehaving toward a child in a manner consistent with being the child’s parent and
performing functions that are customarily performed by a parent, including fulfilling
parental responsibilities toward the child, recognizing or holding out the child as the
individual’s child, materially participating in the child’s upbringing, and residing with
the child in the same household as a regular member of that household.
Id. § 2-115(4) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 50 (Supp. 2011).
54.
Unif. Parentage Act, historical notes (2002), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001).

Monopoli FTP 5_C.doc

Summer 2012]

8/8/2012 8:58 AM

Nonmarital Children and Uniform Probate Code

1003

the UPC.55 In the UPA’s Prefatory Note, the authors write that the
UPA was specifically promulgated to address the inequality of
56
nonmarital children. Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions
from 1968 through 1972, states needed legislative guidance—many
state statutes governing the rights of nonmarital children (or lack
thereof) were “either unconstitutional or subject to grave
constitutional doubt,”57 and compliance with the Court’s new case
58
law was required.
Section 2 of the original UPA read, “The parent and child
relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent,
regardless of the marital status of the parents.”59 Section 3 provided
that a mother-child relationship was established by proof of giving
birth to the child.60 Section 4 provided that a father-child
relationship was presumed if, among other things, the man was
married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth, had
attempted to marry her before the child’s birth (although the
attempted marriage could be declared invalid), married the
mother at a later time and acknowledged paternity in writing, was
named with his consent on the child’s birth certificate, or was
obligated to support the child by voluntary promise or by court
order.61 A presumption of paternity also existed under section 4 if
the man received the child into his home while the child was a
minor, and openly held the child out as his natural child or
acknowledged his paternity in writing.62

55.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-115 Legislative Note (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 51
(Supp. 2011) (“States that have enacted the Uniform Parentage Act (2000, as amended)
should replace ‘applicable state law’ in paragraph (5) with ‘Section 201(b)(1),(2), or (3) of
the Uniform Parentage Act (2000, as amended).’ Two of the principal features of Articles 1
through 6 of the Uniform Parentage Act (2000, as amended) are (i) the presumption of
paternity and the procedure under which that presumption can be disproved by
adjudication and (ii) the acknowledgement of paternity and the procedure under which
that acknowledgement can be rescinded or challenged.”).
56.
See Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (2002), 9B U.L.A 378 (2001). Professor
Krause is mentioned multiple times for his contributions to the movement to put
nonmarital children on equal footing with marital children. The UPA itself, according to the
note, is based on Krause’s A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, supra note 1, and “Professor
Krause agreed to serve as reporter to the committee.” Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note
(2002), 9B U.L.A 378 (2001).
57.
Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (2002), 9B U.L.A 378 (2001).
58.
See id. The prefatory note goes on to cite two cases that were important in this
change: Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972), and Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). See Unif. Parentage Act, prefatory note (2002), 9B U.L.A. 379
(2001).
59.
Unif. Parentage Act § 2 (1973) (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 390 (2001).
60.
See § 3, 9B U.L.A. 391 (2001).
61.
See § 4(a)(1)–(3), 9B U.L.A. 393–94 (2001).
62.
See § 4(a)(4)–(5), 9B U.L.A. 394 (2001).
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The UPA underwent significant revisions in 2000.63 Under
section 201 of the revised UPA, a mother-child relationship can be
established by:
(1) the woman’s having given birth to the child, except
as otherwise provided in Article 8;
(2) an adjudication of the woman’s maternity;
(3) adoption of the child by the woman; or
(4) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent
of a child born to a gestational mother if the
agreement was validated under Article 8 or is
enforceable under other law.64
A father-child relationship can be established by:
(1) an unrebutted presumption of the man’s paternity
of the child under Section 204;
(2) an effective acknowledgement of paternity by the
man under Article 3, unless the acknowledgment
has been rescinded or successfully challenged;
(3) adjudication of the man’s paternity;
(4) adoption of the child by the man;
(5) the man’s having consented to assisted reproduction
by his wife under Article 7 that resulted in the birth
of the child; or
(6) an adjudication confirming the man as a parent of a
child born to a gestational mother if the agreement
was validated under Article 8 or is enforceable
65
under other law.
The Comment to this section notes that section 4 of the UPA
(1973) was expanded here “to include all possible bases of the
66
parent-child relationship.”
As noted above, section 202 of the UPA (2000) provides that a
nonmarital child has the same rights as a child born to married
parents.67 The Comment notes that that “this is one of the most
significant substantive provisions of the [UPA (2000)],”68
reaffirming the principle that first appeared in the original UPA.69
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See Unif. Parentage Act, historical notes (2002), 9B U.L.A. 295 (2001).
Id. § 201(a), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001).
Id. § 201(b), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001).
Id. § 201 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001).
See id. § 202 (2000), 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001).
Id. § 202 cmt. (2000), 9B U.L.A. 310 (2001).
See id.
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However, the Comment also notes that this “broad” statement
regarding the rights of nonmarital children does not eliminate all
70
distinctions between nonmarital children and marital children. As
an example of such a distinction, the Comment references section
2-705(b) of the pre-2008 UPC:
In short, the UPC (1993) provides that an individual is
presumed not to be included in a class gift from someone
other than the child’s parent unless that individual lived as a
member of the parent’s family during childhood. This
presumed intent of the donor is rebuttable. Although this
provision probably has a disproportionate effect on
nonmarital children, the disparity is not based on the
circumstances of birth, but rather on post-birth living
71
conditions.
Section 204 reiterated the traditional marital presumption that the
husband of a woman who gives birth is the legal father of that
72
child. The UPA was amended in 2002 as a result of “objections” to
the 2000 version raised by the American Bar Association Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities and the American Bar
Association Committee on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children.73
After much controversy, section 204 was amended to include a
presumption of paternity for a nonmarital child whose father had
lived in the household for two years after the child’s birth and
“openly held the child out as his own.”74
II. The Outlier: UPC Section 2-705(e)
Taken together, the case law, the UPA, and the UPC have
evolved to produce a large measure of equality for nonmarital
children. NCCUSL is to be commended for giving voice to a
powerful expressive dimension of American equality jurisprudence
in crafting these uniform laws. Since its inception in 1969, the UPC
has made great strides toward providing a comprehensive equality
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
See id. § 204, 9B U.L.A. 310 (2001).
73.
Unif. Parentage Act prefatory note (2002), 9B U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 2011).
74.
Unif. Parentage Act § 204(a)(5) (2002), 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2011); see also
Paula Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance
Law?, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 857, 882–83 (2008) (citing John J. Sampson, Preface to the
Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act (2002), 37 Fam. L.Q. 1 (2003)) (discussing the history
of the revised UPA).
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framework for nonmarital children in the context of inheritance
law. The overarching theme has been to eliminate barriers for such
children in inheriting from their fathers and to minimize the
stigma attached to being a nonmarital child in our society. The
only piece of the framework that arguably still impedes full equality
is the agency approach taken in the area of class gifts from
nonparent transferors, as embodied in section 2-705(e) of the
UPC.
In her recent article, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma and
75
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, Professor Solangel
Maldonado notes that the pre-2008 UPC section 2-705(b), which
required a child to have lived with his father or father’s relatives,
seemingly singled out nonmarital children for differential
treatment.76 This is an important issue because of the increasing
number of nonmarital children who may be affected by such an
approach.77 While the 2008 amendments to Article II replaced
living with the father with having the father function as a parent in
section 2-705, Maldonado correctly notes that the post-2008 section
2-705(e) “has a similarly disparate impact on nonmarital
78
children.” Section 2-705(e) provides:
[A] child of a genetic parent is not considered the child of
the genetic parent unless the genetic parent, a relative of the
genetic parent, or the spouse or surviving spouse of the
genetic parent or of a relative of the genetic parent
functioned as a parent of the child before the child reached
79
[18] years of age.
Maldonado provides the following illustration of section 2-705(e):

75.
Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against
Nonmarital Children, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 345 (2011).
76.
See id. at 359.
77.
The number of children born out of wedlock in this country has risen significantly.
There were 89,500 out-of-wedlock births in 1940 compared with more than 1.7 million such
births in 2009. Stephanie J. Ventura, Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Changing
Patterns of Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States 2 (2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf (reporting nonmarital births as a
percentage of all births rising from 18.4% in 1980 to 39.7% in 2007); see also Brady E.
Hamilton et al., Nat’l Ctr. For Health Statistics, Births: Preliminary Data for
2009 4 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_03.pdf
(reporting that nonmarital births climbed to 41.0% of all births in 2009).
78.
Maldonado, supra note 75, at 359.
79.
Unif. Probate Code § 2-705 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141–42 (Supp. 2011)
(alteration in original).
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[A] nonmarital child whose father (let’s call him David) had
little contact with her (even though paternity is undisputed),
and thus never functioned as a parent, would not be
considered David’s genetic child for purposes of a third
80
party’s bequest to “David’s descendants.”
Essentially, under section 2-705, if the child is not in the family
circle, the father is not considered the child’s parent. The child
would, therefore, not receive any part of a nonparent’s class gift to
the father’s descendants.
A. History of Section 2-705(e)
As noted above, section 2-611 of the original UPC provided that
nonmarital children would be included in class gifts from their
mothers or through their mothers. However, in order for such
children to be included in class gifts from or through their fathers,
the father would have had to have openly and notoriously held
81
such a child out as his own. In 1975, the UPC drafters altered that
rule by deleting the clause that required a different standard for
inheriting from fathers. Thus, the 1975 version of section 2-611
provided that all nonmarital children would be included in class
gifts (presumably from parents or nonparents) if they were eligible
to inherit under the intestacy provisions of section 2-109.82 In
making this change, the drafters explained:
2-611 is a change, again, to conform the Uniform Probate
Code to the Uniform Parentage Act. Here we are dealing with
the meaning to be given to words used by a testator called
“class gift” terms, which include “child”, “issue” or other
terminology, for somebody to figure out when is a child a
child, and, specifically, is an illegitimate child a child?
The former language of the Code, as now enacted, in lines 10
through 12 on page 20 of this package, put a burden of
special proof here—not a child of the father, unless the
person is openly or notoriously so treated. We support now, or
suggest now, a total deletion of the special burden of proof to
show parentage by a father of a child born out of wedlock,
and that's what lines 8, 9 and 10 are about.
80.
81.
82.

Maldonado, supra note 75, at 359–60.
See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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We delete this. We leave in, as bracketed, the old language,
again for the same reason as formerly described, that this has
been enacted and picked up by at least one or two of the
states that have picked up the Code, and we don't want, by
amending it, to put them in a category of noncompliance
here.83
In 1990, as discussed above, section 2-611 became section 284
705, and an agency theory was adopted to support a shift in
policy. A nonmarital child who would have automatically been
included in a class gift from a nonparent if he qualified as a child
for purposes of intestacy from 1975–1990 would now have to
overcome a hurdle not required of marital children. He would
have to establish that he lived in the household of a family member
in order to inherit. The Comment to section 2-705 of the UPC
described the agency theory upon which the shift was grounded: a
transferor would only want a child to be included in a class gift if
the child lived with the parent (or parent’s relative) before turning
eighteen.85 This language was based on the California Probate
Code.86

83.
National Conference Proceedings, supra note 45, at 13–14 (noting why there was a
switch from a system placing a “burden” on the child to a system conforming to the UPA).
84.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-705 (1993). It should be noted that the pre-2008 UPC
was arguably neutral in that it made both marital and nonmarital children subject to the test
imposed: “By its terms, the section is not limited to cases involving non-marital children, but
the most obvious case contemplated would involve a gift from O to ‘A’s children’ where A
has a non-marital child.” Patricia G. Roberts, Adopted and Nonmarital Children—Exploring the
1990 Uniform Probate Code’s Intestacy and Class Gift Provisions, 32 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J.
539, 545–46 (1998) (discussing UPC § 2-705). The pre-2008 section 2-705(a) “provides that
adopted and non-marital children are included in class gifts if they, at a minimum, qualify to
take under the rules for intestate succession . . . . If the transferor is not the natural or
adopting parent, sections (b) and (c) impose requirements in addition to the section 2-114
intestacy requirements.” Id. at 545. Section (b) provides:
In addition to the requirements of subsection (a), in construing a dispositive
provision of a transferor who is not the natural parent, an individual born to the
natural parent is not considered the child of that parent unless the individual lived
while a minor as a regular member of the household of that natural parent or of that
parent’s parent, brother, sister, spouse or surviving spouse.
Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(b) (1990) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 188 (1998).
However, the post-2008 section 2-705(b) specifically applies subsection (e) to a child born
to parents “who are not married.” Id. § 2-705(b) (2008) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 141
(Supp. 2011). Thus, I would argue it is not status-neutral.
85.
See Unif. Probate Code, § 2-705 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 188
(1998).
86.
Id. California’s probate code reads:
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In 2008, section 2-705 was revised again. The drafters noted that
the revisions were based on the most recent version of the
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers
regarding class gifts.87 The first Restatement had embodied the
common law rule in 1940, which excluded nonmarital children
from class gifts by both parents and nonparents unless a contrary
intent was indicated.88 However, in 1988 the drafters of the
Restatement (Second) reversed that rule and presumptively
included nonmarital children in class gifts to one’s children or the
children of another under section 25.2.89
90
The Restatement (Third) of Property echoes the UPC section
2-705 shift in the form of a new section 14.7 that replaced the prior
section 25.2.91 It too provides that while a nonmarital child will be
included in a class gift from a parent, he will only be included in a
gift from a nonparent if the parent or the parent’s relative
functioned as a parent to the nonmarital child.92

§ 21115. Halfbloods, adoptees, persons born out of wedlock, stepchildren and foster
children; inclusion[.]
....
(b) In construing a transfer by a transferor who is not the natural parent, a person
born to the natural parent shall not be considered the child of that parent unless the
person lived while a minor as a regular member of the household of the natural
parent or of that parent’s parent, brother, sister, spouse, or surviving spouse.
Cal. Prob. Code § 21115 (West 2011).
87.
See Unif. Probate Code, § 2-705 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 142 (Supp.
2011).
88.
See Restatement of Prop. § 286(1) (1940) (“Children”—Exclusion of Illegitimate
Descendants).
89.
The prior section 25.2 provides:
When the donor of property describes the beneficiaries thereof as the “children” of a
designated person, the primary meaning of such class gift term includes a descendent
in the first generation of such person who is born out of wedlock. It is assumed, in
the absence of language or circumstances indicating a contrary intent, that the donor
adopts such primary meaning.
Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Donative Transfers § 25.2 (1988). The comment to
this section states that “[t]he time has come to shift from a rule that requires a finding of an
intent of the donor to include a child born out of wedlock to a rule that requires a finding
of an intent to exclude the child. The rule of this section makes that shift.” Id. § 25.2 cmt. a.
90.
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (2011).
91.
See id. § 14.7 reporter’s note.
92.
See id. § 14.7; see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class Gifts Under the Restatement (Third)
of Property, 33 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 993, 1000 (2007) (“In construing a class gift created by
someone other than the child's genetic parent, a nonmarital child is also treated as a child
of the child’s genetic parent, but only if: (i) the generic parent [sic], the genetic parent’s
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Thus, section 2-705(e) represents what some would argue is a
more nuanced view of the nonparent transferor’s intent—only
intending to include a nonmarital child in a class gift if the child
was part of the family circle. But from 1975 to 1990, the UPC had
allowed all nonmarital children to be included in class gifts from
both parents and nonparent transferors. In the following sections,
I argue for a return to that approach under the former section 2611, and a move away from the agency approach embodied in
section 2-705(e). My argument is grounded in both policy and
concerns about inequality under an equal protection analysis. First,
however, I will review the foundational principle that divining the
testator’s intent is an essential goal of inheritance law, and how
rules of construction, such as section 2-705, facilitate that goal.
1. Divining the Testator’s Intent Under UPC Section 2-705
Section 2-705 of the UPC is a rule of construction. Such rules
are used in the law to construe statutes and instruments.93 In the
example above, where a grandmother leaves a bequest in her will
to her son’s “children,” a court would use section 2-705 to divine
the testator’s intent as to whether she meant to include both
marital and nonmarital children when her intention is not
specified in her will. Many authors have characterized divining
testator’s intent as the polestar of inheritance jurisprudence.94 A
grandparent or a descendant of the genetic parent’s grandparent, or the spouse, surviving
spouse, domestic partner, or surviving domestic partner of any of the foregoing functioned
as a parent of the child before the child reached the age of majority . . . .”) (footnote
omitted). See also Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class Gifts Under the Restatement (Third) of Property
10–11 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 266, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2006627.
93.
See Black’s Law Dictionary 234 (9th. ed. 2009)
94.
Freedom of testation and testator’s intent are frequently identified as paramount
jurisprudential touchstones in the area of trusts and estates. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The
Uniform Probate Code’s Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1, 2
(2003). For example, in writing about this area of the law, scholars note, “The organizing
principle of Anglo-American law is freedom of disposition: the donor’s intention is given
effect except to the extent that it contravenes public policy.” Id. at 2; see also Jane B. Baron,
Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 Duke L.J. 630, 634 (1992) (“The rhetoric of wills law
portrays wills as exercises of autonomy and self-determination.”); Pamela R. Champine, My
Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical Testator, 80 Neb. L. Rev. 387, 394
(2001) (“[T]he communication of dispositive wishes is the ultimate purpose of the will.”);
Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 199, 209 (2001)
(“Donative freedom is a principal value in the American system of inheritance.”); Adam J.
Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 1057, 1114 (1996) (“As judges never
tire of reiterating, the object of [will interpretation] is to glean the intent of the testator.”)
(footnote omitted). These scholars have then gone on to explore the accuracy and the

Monopoli FTP 5_C.doc

Summer 2012]

8/8/2012 8:58 AM

Nonmarital Children and Uniform Probate Code

1011

formalist might characterize the purpose of rules of construction
that aid the court in divining intent as a means for finding the
95
individual’s actual or subjective intent. This would differentiate
the purpose of rules of construction from the purpose of intestacy
statutes, which formalists would argue are in fact expressions of the
state legislature’s intent as to how property should be reallocated at
death.96 However, some scholars have noted that rules can actually
yield only an imputed intent, not the actual subjective intent of a
97
testator. Other scholars have noted the fallacy inherent in the
effort to assign a real or absolute meaning to the testator’s words.98

wisdom of those doctrinal touchstones. See Baron, supra, at 634–78; Champine, supra, at 396–
464; Foster, supra, at 209–15; Hirsh, supra, at 114–15; Waggoner, supra, at 2–4.
95.
For a broader discussion of formalism and legal realism in the context of statutory
construction, see John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons’ Revival, 5 Green Bag 2d
283 (2002):
In the twelve quick pages of Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, Karl Llewellyn largely persuaded two
generations of academics that the canons of construction were not to be taken
seriously. His point was simple: The canons are indeterminate, and judges use them
to justify reasoning by other means. With less impact, earlier realists had made similar
claims. But Llewellyn made a chart. At the end of his essay, he aligned 28 “Thrusts”
against 28 “Parries.” Finding that each canon had an equal and opposite counterpart,
Llewellyn urged courts to “give up that foolish pretense [that] there must be a set of
mutually contradictory correct rules on How to Construe Statutes.” In place of these
technicalities, Llewellyn proposed a more functional approach to interpretation—
one that sometimes sought legislative “intent,” but more commonly tried “to make
sense” of a statute in light of its “[b]road purposes.”
Id. at 283 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950)).
96.
See id. at 284.
97.
Although many cases identify the importance of freedom of testation and of
effectuating testators’ intent, one scholar correctly noted:
Our property law system reinforces the classical liberal conception of rights as
instruments for promoting individual autonomy. The cloak of private law, along with
the traditional view that a donative transfer represents the property owner’s unilateral
act, causes many to fall into the trap of believing that the law implements, and only
should implement, an individual’s subjective intent. The state, however, has no direct
access to the property owner’s subjective will. It only can determine the manifestation
of the property owner’s will through words and actions. The state’s dependence on
the property owner’s manifestation of intent moves its inquiry from identifying
subjective intent to imputing intent.
Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 611, 611–12 (1988)
(footnotes omitted).
98.
See Scott T. Jarboe, Note, Interpreting a Testator’s Intent from the Language of Her Will: A
Descriptive Linguistics Approach, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 1365 (2002). Jarboe writes,

Monopoli FTP 5_C.doc

1012

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

8/8/2012 8:58 AM

[Vol. 45:4

Rules of construction in inheritance law are used to divine the
99
donor’s intent in the absence of a finding of contrary intent. As
rules that supply a definition of “child” that causes a substantive
difference in the distribution of a class gift, they seem very similar
to intestacy statutes100 when viewed through the lens of legal
realism.101 The outcomes are the same: property is reallocated at
death in a manner chosen by the state.102 Judges only resort to
these rules when meaning cannot be ascertained by language or
circumstances; in those instances, they apply these default rules
and ascribe an imputed intent to the donor.103
The importance of this observation is that it raises the spectre of
104
state action. Courts have held intestacy statutes unconstitutional
if they unduly burden the inheritance rights of nonmarital
105
children and at least one state court has extended that analysis to
rules of construction, reasoning that the outcomes—the state
deciding who will receive a share of the testator’s or trustor’s
property—are the same.106 Before considering the constitutional
implications of rules of construction and whether they are
substantively different from intestacy statutes, I will explore the
systemic costs, in terms of efficiency, transaction costs, and
administrative convenience, raised by the current version of
section 2-705 of the UPC.

The ordinary standard [for will interpretation], or “plain meaning,” is simply the
meaning of the people who did not write the document.
The fallacy consists in assuming that there is or ever can be some one real or absolute
meaning. In truth, there can only be some person’s meaning; and that person, whose
meaning the law is seeking, is the writer of the document . . . .
Id. at 1365 (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Andrea W. Cornelison, Dead Man
Talking: Are Courts Ready to Listen? The Erosion of the Plain Meaning Rule, 35 Real Prop. Prob.
& Tr. J. 811, 811 (2001)).
99.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-701 (2011), 8 U.L.A. 181 (1998).
100. See supra text accompanying note 92.
101. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 93, at 979.
102. See supra text accompanying note 92.
103. A number of court cases discuss how rules of statutory construction relate to the
issue of divining donor or testator intent. See, e.g., Langille v. Norton, 628 A.2d 669, 670–71
(Me. 1993); Tetrault v. Mahoney, Hawkes & Goldings, 681 N.E.2d 1189, 1194–95 (Mass.
1997); In re Ruth Easton Fund, 680 N.W.2d 541, 549–52 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); In re Estate
of Tateo, 768 A.2d 243, 246–48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); All Saints’ Parish v.
Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of S.C., 595 S.E.2d 253, 261–64 (S.C. Ct. App.
2004).
104. See infra Part IV.A.
105. See infra Part IV.B.
106. See infra Part IV.C.
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III. Policy Concerns Implicated by the Agency Approach
of UPC Section 2-705(e)
What should the ultimate principle be in reallocating property
at death? The American system is predominantly still a status-based
107
108
system of inheritance and, with some exceptions, does not
generally use behavior as a criterion for inheritance.109 Behaviorbased models of inheritance raise efficiency and administrative
110
costs, even though they tend to maximize fairness. These are
important systemic costs to consider. Adding a behavior-based
criterion like “functioning as a parent” to the process by which
nonmarital children can become eligible to be included in class
gifts from nonparents increases these systemic costs. This is, in
large part, due to the fact that there are more than a million
American children now born out of wedlock each year.111
While genetic connection may not fulfill all of society’s goals for
an inheritance paradigm, it does have the benefit of efficiency. The
American system of inheritance allows citizens to opt out of the
default rules of intestacy by drafting wills and trusts.112 Rules of
construction are only invoked when the testator or transferor fails
113
to make her wishes clear. Thus, a grandmother may exclude an
out-of-wedlock grandchild—she simply must take some affirmative
and clear action to do so.114
I would suggest that in terms of class gifts from nonparents, the
1975 through 1990 version of section 2-611 of the UPC contained
107. See Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49
U. Miami L. Rev. 257, 259 (1994).
108. Slayer statutes are one such exception. See, e.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 250 (West
2011); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 732.802 (West 2010); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8802 (West 2005);
Va. Code. Ann. § 55-402 (West Supp. 2011); and Unif. Probate Code § 2-803 (2011), 8
U.L.A. pt. I, at 172–74 (Supp. 2011). Currently, only a handful of states do not have a slayer
statute. See Gregory C. Blackwell, Comment, Property: Creating a Slayer Statute Oklahomans Can
Live With, 57 Okla. L. Rev. 143, 143 n.4 (2004).
109. See Monopoli, supra note 107, at 259; see also Foster, supra note 94, at 230–31 (citing
Monopoli, supra note 107, at 297, which characterized our system as a status-based system as
opposed to a behavior-based model of reallocating property at death); Frances H. Foster,
Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 1199, 1203 (citing
Monopoli, supra note 107, at 257); Frances H. Foster, Towards a Behavior-Based Model of
Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 77, 80 n.7 (1998) (citing
Monopoli, supra note 107, at 259–60).
110. See Monopoli, supra note 107, at 273–91 (analyzing a behavior-based system of
inheritance).
111. See Hamilton, supra note 77, at 4 (citing recent statistics that nonmarital births
constitute 41 percent of all births in the United States).
112. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 21,
27–28 (1994).
113. See supra Part I.
114. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-705 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
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the rule best suited to achieve equality for nonmarital children.
Moving from the clear language of the prior section 2-611, which
applied the presumption that all nonmarital children are included
in a class gift if the donor’s intent is not clear,115 to a rule where
116
only nonmarital children whose parent “functioned as a parent”
are included in a class gift from a nonparent transferor, creates the
need for the admission of extrinsic evidence. In applying the rule
of construction in a judicial proceeding, the court is forced to look
outside the instrument to determine whether the parent met one
of the complex factors listed in section 2-115 regarding whether
someone functioned as a parent.117 Are these the kinds of inquiries
that really belong in a probate court proceeding determining the
members of a class? While these inquiries may be appropriate in a
custody proceeding to determine parentage, they are cumbersome
at best and speculative at worst. Their utility in divining a testator’s
intent is questionable; the connection between a parent’s
engagement in these behaviors and a nonparent’s intent is tenuous
at best.
In terms of fairness to the nonparent transferor, the adoption of
an agency theory may seem beneficial, but those benefits may be
significantly outweighed by the systemic costs in terms of efficiency
and administrative convenience. In addition, with regard to the
goal of replicating what most decedents would want, or
“majoritarian intent,” the presumptions that underlie the rule in
section 2-705(e) may be gendered. For instance, if one were to do
an empirical survey, one might find that more grandmothers than
grandfathers would want to include a nonmarital child they had
been unaware of, if only to compensate for not having been part of
the child’s life. This may be a controversial proposition, but it
merits consideration.
While courts do allow extrinsic evidence for the purpose of
divining a testator’s intent, they are reluctant to do so because of
the policy and fraud concerns that undergird the requirement that
a testator’s intent be reduced to a witnessed writing.118 The factors
115. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-611 (1975) (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 434
(1998). For the text of Restatement section 25.2, see supra note 89.
116. Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
117. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-115 cmt. (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 51–52 (Supp. 2011).
118. See Jarboe, supra note 98, at 1369 (citing 1 Isaac F. Redfield, Law of Wills
§ 33.12 (4th ed. 1876)); Sir James Wigram, The Law of Wills 535–607 (3rd ed. 1869);
Fellows, supra note 97; Note, Ademption and the Testator’s Intent, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1961)).
Jarboe also notes:
James L. Robertson, a former justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, recognizes
(based on many years of difficulty with the cases on his own docket) that courts have
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courts would use to determine whether someone functioned as a
119
parent are rather fluid, to say the least. This second-level analysis
would only be applied in the absence of contrary evidence of a
testator’s intent.120 At that point, the court invokes the rule of
121
construction. By definition, if a court is applying section 2-705,
there is no contrary intent to be found in the language of the
document.122 But if the court has found no contrary language, the
utility of applying the rule of construction should be to decide the
issue in a final and efficient way. In its current form, section 2705(e) requires the admission of extrinsic evidence to resolve the
subsidiary issue of whether the “parent . . . functioned as a
parent.”123 This may arguably be justified by asserting that
application of the standard and the testimony it requires will result
in an imputed intent on the part of the nonparent grantor that
replicates what most people would want. However it does not yield
the actual subjective intent of the testator. The better choice is to
supply an imputed intent without using a standard that requires
time-consuming and resource intensive testimony and that
efficiently resolves the question of whether the child is a member
of the class, and that errs on the side of including a class of
children that had historically borne the brunt of societal
discrimination.124

a hard time determining testamentary intent in any case, regardless of the clarity of
the will’s language, the existence of extrinsic evidence, or the theoretical approach
underlying the court’s analysis.
Jarboe, supra note 98, at 1369 n.21 (citing James L. Robertson, Myth and Reality—or, Is It
“Perception and Taste?”—in the Reading of Donative Documents, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 1045
(1993)). Jarboe concludes, “Following Robertson’s writing, courts should at least recognize
that their determinations of the meaning of a will’s language are driven by forces other than
merely the established rules of interpretation and construction.” Jarboe, supra note 98, at
1369 n.22.
119. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-115 cmt. (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 51–52 (Supp. 2011).
120. See supra Part I.
121. See id.
122. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
123. Id.
124. Jarboe offers this analysis:
Robertson recognizes that, in attempting to interpret testamentary intent in
situations where the court decides that the language of the will is not sufficiently
ambiguous to require extrinsic evidence of intent, courts “commingl[e] a subjective,
internal approach to meaning with a host of quasi-objective, external standards.” The
negative element of this sort of interpretation, in Robertson’s opinion, is the courts’
“failure to see how deeply interpretive our enterprise is.” Essentially, by couching its
interpretation in quasiobjective standards, a court convinces itself that it has
somehow objectively divined the testator’s true intent.
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IV. Constitutional Concerns Regarding
UPC Section 2-705(e)
Section 2-705(e) of the UPC is based on an agency theory of
class membership that has at its root an imputed intent element. A
nonmarital child may be excluded as a taker under a class gift from
a nonparent if his parent, a relative, or a spouse of his parent or
relative failed to function as a parent, even though he may be
125
genetically related to the parent. This is based on the premise
that a nonparent, such as a grandmother, would not want such a
child to take as a member of a class gift to her son’s “children” if
neither her son nor any other relative had known the child well
enough to function as a parent. In other words, section 2-705(e)
uses the parent “function[ing] as a parent”126 as a surrogate for
whether the nonparent knew and would have wanted to include
the child in the class gift. There are federal and state cases that
may constrain a state’s ability to adopt such an agency theory
unless its entire inheritance scheme is status-neutral. Even then, as
noted above, the agency theory embodied in section 2-705(e) has a
disparate impact on nonmarital children, who are less likely to
have a relative who functioned as a parent.
Note that a nonparent such as a grandmother is free to draft a
will that leaves a bequest to her son’s “children born in wedlock”;
there would be no constitutional concerns with her doing so, since
she is not a state actor.127 In the following section, I will explore the
view that a court’s application of a rule of construction to a class
gift, such as a grandmother’s bequest to her son’s “children”
without further description, might arguably constitute state action
and trigger equal protection concerns when applied to nonmarital
children.

Robertson suggests that courts, in an attempt at intellectual honesty in their
interpretation of wills, should no longer attempt to determine the intent of the
testator. Instead, courts should apply rigid rules of construction to all wills; when a
will uses certain words, a court will interpret the language in a particular way. As
Robertson notes, this approach better conforms to courts’ actual practices.
Jarboe, supra note 98, at 1369 n.22 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (citing
Robertson, supra note 119, at 1053–54).
125. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
126. Id.
127. See infra Part III.A.
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A. What Constitutes State Action?
As noted above, the question of what constitutes state action
turns on whether one views a court’s application of a rule of
128
construction as state action. The state action doctrine is based on
129
the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
130
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
This provision, if read literally, may be construed to limit the
Fourteenth Amendment’s application to those laws or actions
directly passed, taken, or enforced by the state.131 Private action
would arguably be outside the purview of the Fourteenth
132
Amendment.
The early civil rights cases yielded the first restrictive
133
interpretation of the Amendment. In 1883, several cases known
as the Civil Rights Cases were joined in order to determine the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,134 which prohibited
racial discrimination in public accommodations, inns, and public
135
The issue was the validity of the
places of amusement.
petitioners’ convictions under the act.136
The majority opinion, reflecting a narrow reading of the
137
concluded that the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment,
Amendment was limited to remedying state laws that, in effect,
abridged citizens’ rights, privileges, and immunities, or deprived
them of life, liberty, or property.138 The Court’s restrictive view led

128. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (“State action, as that phrase is
understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state
power in all forms.”).
129. See id. at 14–15.
130. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“Individual invasion of individual
rights is not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment.”).
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., id. at 21 (noting that state action of a particular character rather than
invasion of individual rights is the focus of the amendment).
134. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
135. See id.
136. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9.
137. See id. at 21–22.
138. See id. at 21.
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to the conclusion that the act was unconstitutional because it
139
targeted private action rather than state action. The Court stated,
[T]he legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in
this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the
citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be
necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States
may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they
140
are prohibited from making or enforcing . . . .
Thus, the public versus private distinction in the state action
141
doctrine was born.
However, later decisions of the Court offer a much more
142
expansive view of state action. In the seminal case Shelley v.
143
Kraemer, the Court expanded the notion of state action to include
not only the enactment of legislation by the state but also judicial
enforcement of private covenants.144 Mark Rosen describes the
importance of Shelley and the Court’s analysis of the state action
doctrine: “To analyze whether court orders constitute state action,
145
one must begin with the case of Shelley v. Kraemer.”
Shelley involved a group of property owners in Missouri who
wanted to restrict the sale of property in the area to Caucasians
only.146 The property owners entered into a private agreement that,
in effect, provided that “any person not of the Caucasian race” was
147
prohibited from occupying the properties at issue. In violation of
this restrictive covenant, one of the property owners sold property
139. See id. at 23.
140. Id. at 13–14.
141. See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for
Governmental Responsibility (pt. 1), 34 Hous. L. Rev. 333, 343–44 (1997) (discussing the
public versus private distinction in the Civil Rights Cases).
142. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1946) (holding that a person
could not be prosecuted for passing out religious pamphlets in a company-owned town since
it served the same function as a public town); see also Buchanan, supra note 141, at 344–54
(discussing exceptions to the state action doctrine).
143. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
144. See id at 18. See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer: Of Public and
Private Worlds, 67 Wash. U. L.Q. 709 (1989) (commemorating Shelley’s fortieth anniversary);
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Race, Sex, Education and Missouri Jurisprudence: Shelley v. Kraemer
in a Historical Perspective, 67 Wash. U. L.Q. 673 (1989) (commemorating Shelley’s fortieth
anniversary); Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for Keeping;
a Time for Throwing Away?”, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 61 (1998) (arguing that eliminating private
discrimination no longer requires Shelley’s protective state action distinction); Mark Tushnet,
Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 383 (1988) (discussing the
relationship between Shelley’s equality and state action theories).
145. Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 Emory L.J. 171, 188 (2004).
146. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4–5.
147. Rosen, supra note 145, at 188 (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4–5).
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to the Shelleys, who were African-American.148 Kraemer, an owner
of one of the other properties, wanted to enforce the private
agreement that prevented African Americans from occupying the
property.149 He sued to enforce the agreement and effectively divest
150
the Shelleys of title to the property.
Kraemer prevailed in the Supreme Court of Missouri, which
ordered enforcement.151 However, the U.S. Supreme Court
152
overturned the state supreme court. The Court held that the
state supreme court’s enforcement of the restrictive covenant
would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.153 However, as Rosen notes, arriving at such a
normatively attractive outcome was not doctrinally simple: “The
chief obstacle was the understanding that ‘the action inhibited by
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action
as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment
erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful.’ ”154
This private/public distinction focused on, in effect, whether the
action sought would be constitutional if “imposed by state statute or
local ordinance.”155 The Court found that the restrictive covenants
themselves did not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment;156
rather, it was the lower court’s proposed enforcement of the
157
restrictive covenants that was unconstitutional. Rosen further
explains this distinction:
Though the restrictive covenant itself could not be said to be
“action by the State” triggering the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court ruled that “the action of state courts and judicial
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action
of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” After all, the “full coercive power of
government” was being used . . . “to deny to petitioners, on
the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property
rights.” Furthermore, because enforcement orders came from
148. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 5.
149. See id. at 6; Rosen, supra note 145, at 189.
150. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 6.
151. See Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Mo. 1946), rev’d, Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
152. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23.
153. See id. at 20.
154. Rosen, supra note 145, at 189 (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13).
155. Id. (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 11).
156. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
157. See id. at 20.
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courts, the “judicial action in each case bears the clear and
”158
unmistakable imprimatur of the State.
In addition to finding that judicial enforcement of a private
contract would constitute state action, the Court considered:
what aspects of the enforcement order were attributable to
the state. Without explanation, the Court determined that the
substantive provisions of the contract themselves were
appropriately deemed to be action of the state. Under the
Shelley Court’s approach, the question became whether a state
could have enacted into general law the contract’s substantive
provision. Because it could not have, it readily followed that
enforcing the restrictive covenant also violated the guarantee
of equal protection . . . . Under Shelley, the approach is to
determine whether the substantive provision of the contract
the court is asked to enforce could have been enacted into
general law by the state.159
Thus, under the Shelley Court’s expansive view of state action, a
court’s application of a rule of construction to interpret a private
instrument might arguably constitute state action, especially where
judicial application of that rule yields an outcome in which a
historically disadvantaged societal group (nonmarital children) are
treated differently than a similarly situated group (marital
children).160 Although state action based on race is subject to strict
158. Rosen, supra note 145, at 189 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13–
14, 19–20).
159. Id. at 190 (footnotes omitted).
160. Numerous authors discuss the Shelley case and the factors relating to the state
action doctrine. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine:
The Search for Governmental Responsibility (pt. II), 34 Hous. L. Rev. 665, 697–723 (1997);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in
the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 2062, 2327 (2002); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to
the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations,
94 Mich. L. Rev. 302, 316–24 (1995); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 577, 629–31 (1997); Steven Siegel, The
Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition of Constitutional Rights in Private
Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v. Alabama, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 461,
490–513 (1998).
There are also many cases that have grappled with the Shelley doctrine. See, e.g., In re
Adoption of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 751 (Ill. 2002) (discussing whether adoption decree is
state action when filed by private parties; ultimately decided on other grounds); First Nat’l
Bank of Kan. City v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 819–21 (Mo. 1975) (determining that
enforcement of trust by state was not state action); Stephanus v. Anderson, 613 P.2d 533,
540–42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (determining that court-enforced lease termination was not a
state action).
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scrutiny by courts,161 differential treatment based on birth status has
been subject to an intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny as
162
described below.
B. What Level of Constitutional Scrutiny Applies to
Statutes Affecting Nonmarital Children?
The U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
applied the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection analysis to
cases involving discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy in a
163
number of areas, including inheritance law. In the first of these
164
cases, Levy v. Louisiana, the Court found a violation of equal
protection in a statute permitting only legitimate children to
bring wrongful death suits.165 In subsequent cases, the Court went
on to develop the doctrine that statutes which discriminate
against nonmarital children are within the ambit of the Equal
Protection Clause.166 One commentator notes that “the Supreme
Court has recognized for several decades that classifications
treating illegitimate children more harshly than legitimate
children violate [the] [E]qual [P]rotection” Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.167
In Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court held as unconstitutional
an Illinois statute that prevented a nonmarital child from
inheriting from the child’s father unless the child’s mother and
168
father had married. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
rejected the state’s purported rationales of promoting two-parent
families and enhancing the orderly disposition of estates.169 Powell
stated that the standard of scrutiny used by the Court (which was
arguably an intermediate standard of scrutiny) was “not a toothless

161. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
162. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461–62 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny for
nonmarital children).
163. See Nikki Ahrenholz, Comment, Miller v. Albright: Continuing to Discriminate on the
Basis of Gender and Illegitimacy, 76 Denv. U. L. Rev. 281, 284–87 (1998); see also Monopoli,
supra note 74, at 860–68.
164. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
165. See Ahrenholz, supra note 163, at 285 (discussing Levy, 391 U.S. at 71–72).
166. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388–94 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259, 268 (1978); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 807 (1977); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977). See generally Ahrenholz, supra note 163, at 285–86 (discussing these cases).
167. Ahrenholz, supra note 163, at 303 (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 388–89).
168. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776.
169. See id. at 769–73.
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one”170 and that the state statute at issue had no more than an
“attenuated relationship to the asserted goal” of encouraging
171
family relationships.
One year later, in Lalli v. Lalli, Powell again wrote for the Court
in a five-to-four decision that upheld a New York statute that
allowed a nonmarital child to inherit if paternity was established by
adjudication while the putative father was alive.172 However, the
statute did not allow a nonmarital child to establish paternity after
173
the father had died. This was arguably a broader statute than the
Illinois statute struck down in Trimble, because marriage was not
174
the sole manner by which a nonmarital child could inherit. The
state argued that its interests in the orderly disposition of estates
and limiting the adjudication of paternity to the father’s lifetime to
prevent fraudulent claims were enough to justify the disparate
treatment of nonmarital children.175 This time, the Court agreed
with the state and upheld the statute.176
Trimble and Lalli involved intestacy statutes—the rules we use to
reallocate property at death when citizens do not create their own
instruments of property disposition.177 Since our system allows for
freedom of testation and has little in the way of forced heirship
(unlike civil law countries), an individual can draft a will or trust to
alter the default intestacy rules.178 As noted above, testators often
create class gifts, such as in our example of the grandmother who
179
leaves a bequest to her son’s “children.” Courts must then apply
rules of construction to decide whether to include both marital
180
and nonmarital grandchildren in the class gift. Only a handful of
state supreme courts have grappled directly with the issue of
whether such judicial activity constitutes state action that triggers

170. Id. at 767 (quoting the Court’s description of the less–than-strict scrutiny applied
to classifications based on illegitimacy in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
171. Id. at 768. While the Court in Trimble used language that could be interpreted as an
intermediate standard of review, the Court did not explicitly adopt that standard with regard
to nonmarital children until Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); see also Ahrenholz, supra note
163, at 287 (citing Clark, 486 U.S. at 461).
172. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 261, 275–76.
173. See id. at 261–62.
174. Compare N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967), with 110 1/2
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 2-2 (West 1978).
175. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268–71.
176. See id. at 275–76.
177. See Estate of Dulles, 431 A.2d 208, 213 (Pa. 1981).
178. See id. (quoting lower court decision, 29 Fiduc. Rep. 141, 148 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
1979)).
179. See Jesse Dukeminier & Stanley M. Johanson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 361
(3d ed. 1984).
180. See Dulles, 431 A.2d at 213–14.
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.181
While a legislature’s enactment of a state intestacy statute clearly
constitutes state action, it is far less clear whether the application of
a rule of construction by a court meets our jurisprudential
182
understanding of what constitutes state action.
C. Does Application of a State Rule of Construction Involving Class Gifts
and Nonmarital Children Constitute State Action?
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Estate of Dulles was faced
with a situation in which a grandmother, Ida Dulles, drafted a trust
that created a classic class gift.183 The terms of the trust provided
that income was to be paid to those of her grandchildren who
184
reached the age of twenty-one. Ida had a nonmarital grandchild,
185
Gloria Dulles, who was the child of Ida’s son, Harrison.186 The
dispute focused on whether Gloria should be included in the class
187
gift. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s analysis in Dulles is
instructive in considering whether section 2-705(e)188 raises
constitutional concerns.
The court in Dulles was considering a state statute—section
14(7) of the Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947189—that was a rule of
190
construction. The statute provided that “in construing a will
making a devise or bequest to a person or persons described by
relationship to the testator or to another, a person born out of
wedlock shall be considered the child of his mother and not of his
father.”191
The court noted:
On April 26, 1977, before Gloria Dulles’ exceptions were
decided, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Trimble v. Gordon. Trimble held unconstitutional as violative of
equal protection a state intestacy statute which excluded a
child born out of wedlock from participation in the estate of
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See, e.g., infra Part III.C.
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
See Dulles, 431 A.2d at 209.
See id. at 210.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 211.
See Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
See Dulles, 431 A.2d at 210.
See id.
See id. (quoting 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 14(7) (1947)).
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the child’s father, even though the father had acknowledged
192
paternity.
As a result, “[o]n September 12, 1977, in light of Trimble, the
orphans’ court . . . dismissed Gloria Dulles’ exceptions without
prejudice and referred the matter to [an] auditing judge for
further consideration.”193 The court recognized that even though
the statute at issue was a rule of construction rather than an
intestacy statute, both it and the Trimble statute involved state
action and raised similar constitutional concerns.194 In both
statutes, no means were provided for a nonmarital child to
establish eligibility to benefit from the father’s estate or that of an
ancestor claimed through the father.195
The Dulles court’s analysis is persuasive:
There can be little doubt that, under Trimble v. Gordon, the
canon of construction which would operate to exclude Gloria
Dulles is constitutionally flawed. A State may not “attempt to
influence the actions of men and women by imposing
sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate
relationships.” And, because it is undisputed that Harrison
Dulles is Gloria Dulles’ father, “the State’s interest in the
accurate and efficient disposition of property at death would
not be compromised in any way by allowing [the] claim
. . . .”196
The court went on to note the similarity between a state
intestacy statute and a rule of construction in terms of the role the
state plays in both—an important conceptual link with regard to
constitutional analysis, because state action is required in order to
make an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth
197
Amendment :

192. Id. at 211–12 (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 212.
194. See id. at 213–14.
195. The court noted that both Section 14(7) of the Pennsylvania Wills Act of 1947 and
the statute at issue in Trimble were distinguishable from Lalli, where the Supreme Court
“upheld a New York statute allowing a child born out of wedlock to inherit from his father
who died intestate only if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the father’s lifetime,
entered an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding commenced during the
mother’s pregnancy or within two years of the child’s birth.” Dulles, 431 A.2d at 213 n.5.
196. Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at
769, 772).
197. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
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Although Trimble involved a state intestacy statute, while here
there is involved a “canon of construction,” in both cases the
judgment of the sovereign is interposed to effectuate
distribution of the decedent’s estate. As Judge Klein observed,
“[a] person has the right to write a will disposing of his
property at death. If he fails to do so, the state steps in and
writes a will for him by means of an intestate act and directs
the manner in which his estate shall be distributed,
designating the persons who shall receive the property and
the proportions they are to receive. If a person writes a will
but fails to express his intent clearly, or fails to make a
complete distribution of his property, or otherwise runs
counter to some rule of law, the state also steps into . . . the
gap through a statutorily enacted rule of construction which
mandates the manner of distribution. In both cases the state
and not the decedent dictates the method of distribution.”198
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, given the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Trimble, the lower court was correct to hold the
rule of construction unconstitutional.199 The court went on to note
that the presumed intent argument—that the testator would want
to exclude out-of-wedlock children—had been discredited by the
Trimble Court:
There, where an intestacy statute excluding a child born out
of wedlock from taking through a father was challenged, it
was argued that the intestacy statute “mirrors the presumed
intentions of the citizens of the State regarding the
disposition of their property at death,” and that the father’s
failure to make a will “shows his approval of that disposition.”
Although the contention had not been relied upon by the
state courts, and therefore was not a matter for the Court to
decide, Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, dismissed the
200
contention . . . .
The Dulles court went on to quote Justice Powell’s words, which
give pause when reading section 2-705(e) of the UPC:

198. Dulles, 431 A.2d at 213 (alteration in original) (quoting lower court decision, 29
Fiduc. Rep. 141, 148 (Ct. Ct. Com. Pl. 1979)).
199. See id.
200. Id. at 214 (citation omitted) (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 774).
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Even if one assumed that a majority of the citizens of the State
preferred to discriminate against their illegitimate children,
the sentiment hardly would be unanimous. With regard to any
individual, the argument of knowledge and approval of the
State law is sheer fiction. The issue therefore becomes where
the burden of inertia in writing a will is to fall. At least when
the disadvantaged group has been a frequent target of
discrimination, as illegitimates have, we doubt that a State
constitutionally may place the burden on that group by
invoking the theory of “presumed intent.”201
The Dulles court concluded:
As in Trimble, it cannot be said that testators whose wills fail to
contain specific provisions are unanimous in the sentiment to
discriminate against children born out of wedlock. Because
settlor has failed to write a specific provision governing Gloria
Dulles’ right to share in trust income, we are left with the
decision made by the sovereign, in the form of a canon of
construction, to place upon Gloria Dulles the “burden of
inertia” and thereby exclude her. That canon is constitutionally
infirm, and Gloria Dulles must prevail on this issue.202
203
Unlike the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts rejected the idea that the application of a
204
In Powers v.
rule of construction constituted state action.
Wilkinson, the trustee of an inter vivos trust sought a declaratory
judgment that a child born out of wedlock to the donor’s
granddaughter was “issue” of the donor’s children for purposes of
the trust.205 The trust instrument “provided for payment . . . [to the
donor’s] surviving children in equal shares for the duration of
their lives, and then to the children’s ‘issue’ by right of
206
representation.” In the instrument itself, the donor did not
elaborate on whether she meant to include all issue, marital and
207
208
nonmarital; she simply used the word “issue.”

201. Dulles, 431 A.2d at 214 (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at 775 n.16).
202. Id. at 214.
203. See id. at 213 (accepting the lower court’s finding that the application of the rule of
construction did constitute state action).
204. Powers v. Wilkinson, 506 N.E. 2d 842, 845 (Mass. 1987).
205. Id. at 842.
206. Id. at 843.
207. See id.
208. Id.
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The trustee believed that the term “issue” should include
209
nonmarital children, absent a showing of contrary intent. The
trustee first argued that absent extrinsic evidence establishing that
the donor ascribed a special meaning to the term “issue,” her
intent must have been to use it in its usual and customary meaning
(as defined in Webster’s Dictionary): biological issue, progeny, or
offspring, regardless of a parent’s marital status.210 The court
rejected this argument and referred to its previous decision in
211
Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, in which it stated:
It cannot be doubted that by the common law of a few
generations ago such words as issue, children, descendants,
and so forth as descriptive of a class in a grant, devise, or
legacy, in the absence of anything indicating a contrary intent,
meant only persons of the class who were born in lawful
wedlock.212
The Powers court concluded:
Because nothing indicate[d] an intent by the donor to
include nonmarital issue, [Mishou] require[d] [the court] to
presume that the donor intended, in accordance with the law
extant at the time the instrument was executed, to exclude
nonmarital descendants from the class denoted by her use of
the word “issue.”213
Next, “the trustee argue[d] that application of the rule of
construction stated in Mishou would violate the rights of the
nonmarital child to the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”214 Citing Shelley v. Kraemer, the
trustee argued that the rule of construction set forth in Mishou is
subject to scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because,
according to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[s]tate action . . . refers to
exertions of state power in all forms.”215 The court rejected the
trustee’s equal protection argument.216 First, the court noted that
209. See id. at 844.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 848 (citing Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 75 N.E.2d 3 (Mass. 1947), overruled
by Powers, 506 N.E.2d at 848–49).
212. Fiduciary Trust Co., 75 N.E.2d at 14.
213. Powers, 506 N.E.2d at 844.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 845 (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 20 (1948)).
216. Powers, 506 N.E.2d at 845.
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“[t]he guarantees of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are directed solely to limiting the actions of
217
government.” Second, the court summarized the basic facts at
issue in Shelley and explained that “[t]he Supreme Court has not
218
Third, the court
developed Shelley beyond these facts.”
distinguished Shelley:
In Shelley, the Court had no doubt that State action was
involved because it was clear that “but for the active
intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply
of state power, [the black] petitioners would have been free to
occupy the properties in question without restraint.” State
action was found because judicial enforcement of the “private
law” of restrictive covenants effectively barred blacks from
participation in a significant segment of the housing market.
In Mishou, the court reaffirmed a definition for a word whose
meaning, as judicial experience repeatedly showed, would
remain ambiguous without judicial clarification. Under the
court’s ruling, donors and testators enjoyed freedom to use
the word “issue” without explication, confident that we would
enforce the instrument containing it to exclude nonmarital
children. Similarly, donors have been free to modify the word
by stating an additional, contrary intent, in which case we
have enforced the instrument to honor that intent. When
“issue” is used in a legal instrument, with or without
explication, it is the donors and testators who act, not this
court nor any other arm of the State.219
Thus, the court held that state action was not involved and that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
not implicated by the court’s application of rules of construction to
220
The court concluded that “no
wills or trust instruments.
constitutional rights would be violated if the [court applied] the
221
rule stated in Mishou” to the case at hand.
The court also noted that the trustee’s equal protection
argument relied primarily on Trimble v. Gordon, which invalidated
an intestacy statute, not a judicially created rule, on equal
protection grounds:
217. Id. at 844.
218. Id. at 845 (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hood,
452 N.E.2d 188, 193 (Mass. 1983)).
219. Powers, 506 N.E.2d at 845 (citation omitted).
220. See id.
221. Id. at 845–46.
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While we do not deny that rules applying to what has
traditionally been thought of as the area of “private law” may
trench upon equal protection concerns, it is instructive to
note that no decision by the United States Supreme Court
ever has invalidated a common law rule of construction on
the ground that it violated the equal protection clause by
discriminating impermissibly against nonmarital children.
The liberalizing decisions handed down by the Supreme
Court in recent years have all been directed at statutory
discrimination.222
Finally, the trustee argued that the Mishou rule “should not be
applied because it is no longer appropriate to do so in light of
current social mores and modern legal developments.”223 The court
agreed, stating:
Ours is an era in which logic and compassion have impelled
the law toward unburdening children from the stigma and the
disadvantages heretofore attendant upon the status of
illegitimacy. Consequently, we think it is more appropriate
henceforth to place the burden of exclusion on those donors
224
who insist on it.
The court “overrule[d] so much of Mishou as depend[ed] upon
the traditional rule of construction[] and . . . conclude[d] that the
word ‘issue,’ absent clear expressions of a contrary intent, must be
construed to include all biological descendants.”225 However, the
court refused to apply the new rule of construction to the
226
nonmarital child in the case at bar, deciding that the new rule
would apply “only to trust instruments executed after the date of
[the] opinion.”227 The case was “remanded to the Probate and
Family Court for Suffolk County for entry of a declaration that,
under the law applicable when the trust . . . was executed, the . . .

222. Id. at 845 n.9. Note that the rule of construction in Dulles was a statutory rule, not
simply a judicially created rule. The new rule in Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch.
190B, § 2-705(a) discussed infra at n.234 and accompanying text, is also a statutory rule.
Query whether that should make a difference in the court’s analysis of whether application
of the rule by a court constitutes state action.
223. Id. at 846.
224. Id. at 848.
225. Id. (footnote omitted).
226. See id. at 849.
227. Id.
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word ‘issue’ is presumed to encompass only lawful lineal
228
descendants of the donor” born within wedlock.
Justice Abrams, in dissent, joined the court’s decision to
“overrul[e] the rule of construction of Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou”
and “to announce [a] new rule of construction which defines
‘issue’ to include all biological descendants regardless of the
marital status of the parents.”229 However, Abrams did not “agree
. . . with the court’s determination that the new rule [should] not
230
apply in [the] case” at bar for two reasons. “First, by merely
announcing the new rule without applying it, the court’s action
231
amount[ed] to no more than dictum.” Second, not granting
relief in the case at hand “remove[d] [the] incentive to bring
challenges to existing precedent because the appellant [was]
deprived of the benefit . . . [of] challenging the old rule.”232
V. Moving Away from an Agency Approach
Which court has the more persuasive argument as to whether
the application of a rule of construction constituted state action:
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Dulles or the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Powers? Are rules of construction in
inheritance law distinguishable in their purpose and effect from
rules of construction in other substantive areas of the law? Given
Justice Powell’s constitutional discrediting of the imputed intent
233
argument in Trimble, one wonders if state statutes that adopt an
agency approach would or should withstand similar scrutiny. It is
interesting that when Massachusetts recently adopted the UPC, it
altered the language of section 2-705 to eliminate any distinction
between marital and nonmarital children when applying the rule
of construction to class gifts.234 It chose to affirmatively reject the
UPC’s agency approach, thus preserving that part of the Supreme
235
Judicial Court’s decision in Powers v. Wilkinson that applied
228. Id.
229. Id. (Abrams, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774–76 (1977).
234. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 190B, § 2-705(a) (Supp. 2011). “Section 2-705.
[Class Gifts Construed to Accord with Intestate Succession.] (a) Adopted individuals and
individuals born out of wedlock, and their respective descendants if appropriate to the class,
are included in class gifts and other terms of relationship in accordance with the rules for
intestate succession . . . . [Effective March 31, 2012].”
235. 506 N.E.2d 842 (Mass. 1987).

Monopoli FTP 5_C.doc

Summer 2012]

8/8/2012 8:58 AM

Nonmarital Children and Uniform Probate Code

1031

prospectively. The Massachusetts legislature is to be commended
for adopting a default rule more akin to the UPC approach that
existed from 1975 to 1990.
The application of rules of construction like section 2-705(e) of
the UPC would arguably fit within the definition of state action
that Rosen says survived the restrictive view of Shelley: “[T]he
general rule outside the context of racial discrimination appears to
be as follows: the underlying legal right will be attributed to the
state under the state action doctrine only if government is the
source of the underlying right.”236 Under section 2-705(e), the
government would in fact be the source of the child’s membership
in the class and her subsequent right to inherit valuable property.
While the nonparent transferor drafts the private instrument that
creates the class gift, in the absence of clear language or
circumstances indicating whether she intended to include a
nonmarital child, the judicial process requires a court to apply a
rule of construction, which will either confer or deny the
nonmarital child membership in the class.237 The court’s
application of the rule determines whether or not the child will
receive a share of the estate or trust.
Characterizing the application of a rule of construction that
determines class membership as “state action” admittedly poses a
slippery slope: that the application of all rules of construction—
those used to interpret wills, trusts, contracts, or other
instruments—will have to be considered state action. However,
there is an argument that this risk is minimized because section 2705(e) is distinguishable from other rules of construction; unlike
many of these other rules, section 2-705(e) implicates a
constitutionally protected group that courts have been willing to
protect under an intermediate scrutiny standard.238 The rule of
construction at issue applies in a way that remedies discrimination
against an historically disadvantaged group that has received
particular constitutional protection in the past. This fact should
weigh against the argument that labeling as state action a court’s
application of this particular rule of construction would require a
finding of state action every time a court construes any contract
between private parties.239

236. Rosen, supra note 145, at 192.
237. See supra Part I.
238. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461–62 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny for
statutory classifications that affect nonmarital children).
239. For a succinct description of this concern with an expansive reading of Shelley v.
Kraemer, see Rosen, supra note 145:
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Even if a court found that the application of such a rule of
construction constituted state action, the rule would be subject to a
second level of inquiry prior to a finding of unconstitutionality.
Given the state’s substantial interest in preventing fraud and
240
ensuring the orderly disposition of estates, such a rule of
construction would, in fact, be allowed to impose some disparate
burdens on nonmarital children if it were sufficiently narrowly
tailored to pass constitutional muster.
The underlying concern in earlier cases involving nonmarital
children and inheritance statutes was that the child be given an
opportunity to prove that the parent from or through whom he
was taking was indeed his parent.241 Once that fact was
established, the state’s interest in minimizing fraud in the
242
inheritance process was alleviated. The model of “function[ing]
243
as a parent” is problematic in this regard because it echoes the
old state statutes that did not provide an adequate mechanism for
the child to control whether a parent could be found to be a
parent in order for the child to inherit from the parent or his
244
relatives. For example, in Lowell v. Kowalski the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found that a state statute that required
the later marriage of two parents, and that did not allow an order
of filiation to suffice as evidence of parenthood,245 was
The problem with the categorical refusal of recent courts to enforce foreign
judgments is not that they misunderstand Shelley, but that they have overlooked that
subsequent case law has significantly narrowed its application. Shelley’s holding was
troubling to American courts and commentators alike because, under its reasoning,
every private contract that a party wishes to judicially enforce triggers state action
such that the substantive provisions of the contract are attributed to the state: “Such
application [erodes] the distinction between public and private action.” . . . .
American courts regularly issue orders that would have been subject to constitutional
constraints, and probably would have been found to be constitutionally infirm, if they
had been enacted by a state legislature as a general law. Arguments that such court
orders qualify as state action under Shelley, and accordingly trigger constitutional
scrutiny, have been regularly rebuffed. . . . [T]he general rule outside the context of
racial discrimination appears to be as follows: the underlying legal right will be
attributed to the state under the state action doctrine only if government is the
source of the underlying right.
Id. at 190–92 (first alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
240. See Jarboe, supra note 98, at 1383.
241. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (noting that the statutory scheme in
that case was “a response to the often difficult problem of proving the paternity of
illegitimate children and the related danger of spurious claims against intestate estates”).
242. See id. at 271–72.
243. Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
244. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265–66.
245. See Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 137–38 (Mass. 1980).
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insufficiently narrowly tailored.246 The concern is that it is unfair to
the nonmarital child to put his ability to inherit completely in the
hands of the parent from or through whom the child is trying to
inherit. Section 2-705(e) effectively does just this because the child
cannot control whether the parent or relatives functioned as a
parent, and that is the only way the child can be included in the
class gift. Unlike a paternity adjudication, which can be initiated by
the child or his mother, whether the father functions as a parent is
not something the child controls.
In addition, the agency approach taken in Section 2-705(e)’s has
been justified on the basis that it is reasonable to presume that
most nonparent transferors whose son or daughter did not
function as a parent to his or her nonmarital child would likely not
want to include such a nonmarital child in a class gift.247 This
presumption that most nonparent transferors would choose to
exclude nonmarital children is very similar to the presumption
that Justice Powell criticized in Trimble, i.e., even if one assumed
most citizens would prefer to discriminate against their illegitimate
children, when that group has been the “frequent target of
discrimination” it is doubtful that a state may constitutionally place
a burden on that group by invoking the theory of presumed intent.
I would argue that this presumption underlying the operation of
section 2-705(e) raises very similar constitutional concerns.248
Under section 2-705(e), even if a child can prove he is the
genetic child of a parent through whom he takes, he can still be
excluded from a class gift by the default rule based on a presumed
intent of the ancestor who created the gift.249 The state has an
interest in preventing fraudulent paternity (or maternity) claims,
but after that risk has been eliminated, the state could not likely
sustain a claim that it also has a substantial interest in perpetuating
an unexpressed, presumed intent on the part of a testator that errs
on the side of excluding a group that has traditionally been
discriminated against in our society.250
Admittedly, section 2-705(e) is unlike the absolute statute in
Trimble that gave a nonmarital child no chance to prove that the

246. See id. at 139 (applying strict scrutiny, in reliance on the Equal Rights Amendment
to the Massachusetts Constitution, to the gender-based distinctions in the portion of state
inheritance law that applied to nonmarital children).
247. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
248. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 (1977).
249. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
250. See Powers v. Wilkinson, 506 N.E.2d 842, 848 (Mass. 1987).
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251

decedent was her biological father. Unlike the statute in Trimble,
section 2-705(e) does not automatically exclude a child from a
class gift by virtue of his nonmarital status;252 if his father
“function[s] as a parent,”253 he can take from his paternal
grandmother, for example. Even so, section 2-705(e) still seems to
contravene the spirit of Trimble and the other Supreme Court cases
that acknowledged that, while the state’s interest in preventing
fraud allowed it to raise some barriers to nonmarital children when
the purpose of those barriers was merely to prove that a parent was
in fact a parent,254 once the child had met that burden, and
parentage was proven, the child should be allowed to inherit with
255
no further obstacles.
Of course, a nonparent transferor like a grandmother has the
right to draft a will or trust that states that only her son’s marital
children shall share in a class gift. In the absence of such a
directive, however, the state supplies a default rule—the applicable
rule of construction—to determine who is a grandchild. Given the
strong concern of the Supreme Court that nonmarital children be
treated the same as marital children absent some substantial state
interest,256 there is at least a constitutional argument against the
default rule embodied in section 2-705(e), i.e., that a child may
indeed be excluded—even absent an ancestor’s clear expression in
writing—simply because of her nonmarital status if her parent did
not function as a parent.257 If the application of this rule of
construction is in fact state action, the rule of construction seems
to do what Justice Powell said was unconstitutional—it creates a
default rule that places “the burden of inertia”258 on the nonmarital
child.259
If there is an argument that a court’s application of a rule of
construction is sufficient to constitute state action, then will any
such statute that distinguishes between marital and nonmarital
251. See Estate of Dulles, 431 A.2d 208, 214 (Pa. 1981) (quoting Trimble, 430 U.S. at
774).
252. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(e) (2011) 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
253. Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 14.7.
254. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 267 (“The single requirement at issue here is an evidentiary
one—that the paternity of the father be declared in a judicial proceeding . . . .”).
255. See id. In Labine v. Vincent, Justice Brennan notes that it is not just “insurmountable
barriers” that may violate the Equal Protection Clause; it is also “discriminations that
‘merely’ disadvantage a class of persons . . . [that] are as subject to the command of the
Fourteenth Amendment as discriminations that are in some sense more absolute.” Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 550–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
256. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972).
257. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
258. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 (1977).
259. See Estate of Dulles, 431 A.2d 208, 214 (Pa. 1981).
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children (placing higher burdens on nonmarital children)
withstand an intermediate level of scrutiny (or even a rational basis
standard) given the new and inexpensive methods of DNA testing
available?260 Such statutes met the intermediate standard in the past
because the state arguably had a substantial interest in preventing
fraudulent claims, which was the basis for the differential burdens
on nonmarital children.261 However, the easy means of testing
genetic paternity today raises new questions about default rules
262
that distinguish between marital and nonmarital children. If one
applied this analysis to statutes like section 2-705(e), one might
conclude that a state could not enact such a law that discriminated
against nonmarital children when the substantial state interest in
preventing fraud is no longer clearly at issue given the ease and
certainty of genetic testing today.
There is also a concern that a rule of construction that uses
“function[ing] as a parent”263 as a standard for inclusion will have a
greater disparate impact on children trying to inherit through or
from fathers as opposed to mothers. For example, if a
grandmother bequeaths a class gift to her son’s “children,” it is less
likely that the son will have functioned as a parent than a daughter
if she had left the bequest to her daughter’s “children”; this is
because nonmarital children who are trying to inherit from or
through their mothers are more likely to be living with their
mothers than nonmarital children who are trying to inherit from
260. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1011, 1022–24 (2003).
Carbone and Cahn lay out four issues involved in choosing a rule that would use biology to
determine legal parenthood:
First, the mechanisms societies use to advance children’s claims on adult resources
are social constructs that vary widely . . . .
Second, all societies condition children’s interests to some degree on the presence of
a genetic tie, if only as a matter of practicality . . . .
Third, all societies, however much weight they place on the genetic tie, have
exceptions . . . .
[Fourth,] not only is the importance of the genetic tie to children an issue capable of
renegotiation in each generation, but moreover it is an issue that is even more
critically important today . . . . [because][i]n this era, childrearing is increasingly
taking place outside of marriage, and the issue of which adults a child has the right to
claim as his own is an increasingly muddled, yet critical, issue.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
261. See supra note 119 and accompanying text; see also Monopoli, supra note 74.
262. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 260, at 1013.
263. Unif. Probate Code § 2-705(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141 (Supp. 2011).
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or through their fathers are to be living with their fathers.264 While
the language of section 2-705(e) is gender-neutral, fathers are less
265
likely to meet its standard than mothers. This disparate impact
raises gender-based equal protection concerns that, like
illegitimacy, are subject to intermediate scrutiny (or, in states like
Massachusetts that have state equal rights amendments, strict
scrutiny).266
Conclusion
The drafters of the UPC and the UPA have been steadfast in
their commitment to a broad equality framework for all children
regardless of their parents’ marital status. The current UPC
embraces status neutrality for nonmarital children in every aspect
except in section 2-705(e) governing class gifts by nonparents. In
that small corner of the UPC, it is more likely that a nonmarital
child will be excluded from a class gift than a marital child. Even if
there is not a powerful constitutional argument against section 2705(e), in balancing the nonparent’s intent against the ability of
the nonmarital child to take as a member of the class, the statute
should not embrace an agency theory that places “the burden of
267
inertia” on the nonmarital child rather than on the nonparent
transferor. It may be true that the approach taken by former
section 2-611 of the UPC yielded some outcomes in which a
nonmarital child was included in a class gift in which a nonparent
transferor would not have wanted him to share. However, the
efficiency costs of an agency approach that imposes a “functioning
as a parent” test are high, and the expressive dimension of the test
with regard to how we treat nonmarital children in the law is
troubling. It is not clear that the benefits of an arguably more
precise divination of donors’ subjective intent are worth the costs.
By amending section 2-705(e) to return to the inclusive
approach taken between 1975 and 1990 in section 2-611, and most
recently taken by the Massachusetts Legislature in Mass. Gen. Laws

264. More than five times as many children living with a never-married parent live with
their mothers rather than with their fathers. See U.S. Census Bureau, America’s Families
and Living Arrangements: 2003 tbl.FG6, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov
/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2003/tabFG6-all-1.pdf.
265. See id.
266. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980) (applying
intermediate scrutiny). But see Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Mass. 1980)
(applying strict scrutiny).
267. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775 n.16 (1977).

Monopoli FTP 5_C.doc

Summer 2012]

8/8/2012 8:58 AM

Nonmarital Children and Uniform Probate Code

1037

Ann. Ch. 190B, section 2-705(a),268 the UPC would eliminate its last
remaining barriers to nonmarital children. The number of cases in
which a nonmarital child who never had any connection to the
parent or family would claim an inheritance is presumably very
small. Thus, one could argue that the price of a few of those
children being included in class gifts from nonparents who might
not have actually wanted such children to be included is well worth
the expressive benefit yielded by erring on the side of
inclusiveness.
Justice Powell cautioned against “the burden of inertia” being
placed on the nonmarital child.269 With the exception of section 2705(e), the UPC has been very responsive to this concern,
embracing a general framework which treats marital and
nonmarital children the same for inheritance purposes. The UPC
has been a model for status equality and its drafters are to be
commended for their leadership on this issue in the area of
inheritance law.

268.
269.

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 190B, § 2-705(a)(Supp. 2011).
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 775 n.16.

